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SALINGER AND EBA Y: WHEN EQUITABLE
CONSIDERATIONS UNDERMINE EXCLUSIVITY
I. INTRODUCTION

When J.D. Salinger wanted to stop someone from exploiting his
best-selling novel Catcher in the Rye, he sought injunctive relief.
Without this remedy, the copyrighted work in which he has the
exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, prepare derivative works,
publicly perform, and publicly display would be available for all to
use.' Unlike physical property, which has clearly delineated
boundaries, the boundaries of intellectual property are vague,
making remedies difficult to assess and enforce. Works under
copyright are unique in that their intellectual property
encompasses an unquantifiable amount of artistic and creative
elements. These elements are impossible to catalogue, so a certain
degree of copying is inevitable. An expressive work can rarely
come into existence without building off existing works. Thus, a
one-size-fits-all approach to resolving infringement claims should
not apply uniformly across all areas of intellectual property law.
The right to exclude others from unauthorized use of a work is
an important and central feature in copyright.2 Yet exclusivity is
difficult to enforce with intellectual property because it is a right in
intangible property. For this reason, preliminary injunctive relief
is a necessary remedy for a plaintiff who seeks to prevent
continuing infringement during the course of litigation.
Traditionally, courts granted preliminary injunctive relief for the
plaintiff who could make a prima facie showing that her
1. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
2. See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ("The owner of
the copyright, if he pleases, may refrain from vending or licensing and content
himself with simply exercising the right to exclude others from using his
property").
3. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (The courts have traditionally granted injunctions
upon a finding of infringement "given the difficulty of protecting a right to
exclude through monetary remedies").
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intellectual property rights had been infringed.
Prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in eBay v.
MercExchange L.L. C.,4 a patentee would be granted injunctive
relief as a matter of course if patent infringement were proved.
The Supreme Court rejected that presumption in eBay, deciding
that courts must apply a four-factor test in deciding whether to
award injunctive relief in patent infringement cases.' That test
evaluates (1) whether the party has suffered irreparable injury, (2)
the adequacy of legal remedies, (3) the balance of hardships
between parties, and (4) the public interest. Recently, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals decided Salinger v. Colting,' holding that
the eBay four-factor test also applies to preliminary injunctions in
copyright infringement cases.'
Both eBay and Salinger illustrate a shift from a property rule
towards a liability rule for intellectual property.' A property rule is
one that protects property rights absolutely through injunctive
relief; a liability rule is one that provides the infringing party pay
damages for the harm.o The more rigid preliminary injunction
standard adopted by the court in Salinger in effect operates like a
liability rule because injunctive relief now requires the court
balance equitable factors by considering potential harm to both
parties, which favors monetary remedies. This equitable standard
was applied even though harm at the preliminary stage is
speculative and the value of the copyright is difficult for a court to
ascertain.

4. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
5. Id at 391 ("According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff
seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may
grant injunctive relief').
6. Id.
7. 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).
8. See id. at 78, n.7 ("[W]e see no reason that eBay would not apply with
equal force to an injunction in any type of case").
9. See Jake Phillips, eBay's Effect on Copyright Injunctions: When Property
Rues Give Way to Liability Rules, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 405, 405-06 (2009)
(forecasting eBay's likely effect on injunctions in copyright).
10. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REv. 1089,
1092 (1972).
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This Note contends that the adoption of the eBay standard in
copyright cases undermines the goals and weakens the exclusivity
that copyright provides. Instead, a property rule preliminary
injunction standard that grants injunctive relief on the merits
would better serve the goals of copyrights based in expressive
works because damages in this context are speculative and based
on incomplete information. The owner's value in a copyrighted
work is inherently subjective and unique. Neither the parties nor
the courts can accurately value the work or the harm caused by the
alleged infringer at the preliminary stage. If the defendant can
overcome an injunction by showing she is more likely to be
economically harmed, or the plaintiff fails to show adequate harm,
the copyright owner's essential right to exclude is completely and
unfairly undermined.
A property rule standard does not necessarily create a windfall
for the plaintiff. By focusing the preliminary inquiry on the
merits, the defendant can still prevent an injunction by invoking a
valid fair use defense. The fair use defense allows the defendant to
weaken the likelihood of success on the merits, and it offers the
court a method for denying an injunction when factors beyond the
Permanent injunctions,
merits weigh in defendant's favor."
however, may be better served by a full analysis of the eBay
standard, since each party will have time to present complete
information and the court will also have sufficient time to weigh
the information.
This Note explores preliminary injunctions in copyright
disputes. Part II will outline the goals of copyright as a property
interest, the protection of property through the property
rule/liability rule dichotomy, and how preliminary injunctions can
operate under either rule regime. Part III will illustrate the
application of a preliminary injunction in copyright through
Salinger, the subject opinion of this Case Note. Part IV will
analyze preliminary injunctions in copyright under property rule
and liability rule regimes, as viewed through the lens of Salinger.

11. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (there are four statutory factors in a fair use
defense); see infra note 28 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND

A. The Nature and Goals of Copyright
Copyright exists "to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."" It
functions to stimulate activity and progress for the general benefit
of society." This utilitarian aim is achieved by granting authors
limited monopolies over their works so that they may reap the
rewards of their creative efforts. 4 Copyright seeks to find an
optimal balance between author incentives and public access to
works to promote "the harvest of knowledge.""
Exclusive property ownership of a copyright is possible in an
original work of authorship that is fixed in any tangible medium of
expression.16 Within an original work, copyright protects many
elements that contribute to the complete work." Similar to the
concept of private property, intellectual property includes the right
to exclude." Without legal remedies for infringement, protection
of exclusive copyrights weakens, decreasing the incentive for
12. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
13. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1105, 1107, 1108, n.12 (1990) (noting that the Supreme Court has summarized
the objective of copyright is to "stimulate activity and progress in the arts for the
intellectual enrichment of the public").
14. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)
("Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must
ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature,
music, and the other arts"), superseded by statute, Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991).
15. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545
(1985).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
17. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 41 (7th ed. 2007)
(explaining that copyrighted elements cannot be indexed like patents;
"copyrights protect an infinitude of sentences, musical phrases, details of
architectural blueprints, and other minutiae of expression . . . some amount of
inadvertent copying is thus unavoidable").
18. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
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authors to pursue ideas. 9
Exclusive rights to intellectual property can be characterized as
the ownership of a public good.20 When copyrighted expression is
disclosed to the public, the work becomes a public good because it
is "nonexcludable"
and "nonrivalrous."21
The term
"nonexcludable" means that one person cannot exclude another
person from using the good. 22 When a person reads information
contained in a book, the author cannot exclude the reader from that
information once it is read. 23 The term "nonrivalrous" means that
one person's use of the information does not reduce the ability of
another person to use the information.24
One person's
consumption of information does not reduce the availability of that
information for another person's consumption, thus more than one
person at a time can possess the information. Public goods are
generally positive for society because unlike tangible goods, the
information is free for all to use. But copyright owners usually
want to retain control over their work; they want the use of their
copyrighted information to be rivalrous.25 Copyright balances
these competing interests through substantive requirements for
copyright infringement and the fair use defense.
To show infringement of a copyright, the plaintiff must prove
ownership of a valid copyright, and copying of constituent
elements of the work that are original.2 6 When these elements are
19. See Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980) ("The copyright provides a financial incentive
to those who would add to the corpus of existing knowledge by creating original
works").
20. See POSNER, supra note 17, at 41.

21. Alan Devlin & Neel Sukhatme, Self-Realizing Inventions and the
Utilitarian Foundation of Patent Law, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 897, 914
(2009).
22. Id. at 914-15.
23. Id. at 915 ("Once the cat is out of the bag, it cannot be put back in").
24. Id.
25. Id. (citing Thomas 0. Barnett, Interoperability Between Antitrust and
IntellectualProperty,
14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 859, 865 (2007)) ("Although information might want
to be free, inventors want to get paid").
26. 4 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,

§ 13.01 (citing Feist

Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); Harper &
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shown, the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of infringement.
But a prima facie showing of infringement does not leave the
defendant without an escape hatch. Section 107 of the Copyright
Act provides the fair use defense, which limits the plaintiff s scope
of rights.27 Fair use considers four factors: (1) the purpose and
character of the use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion used, and (4) the effect
upon the plaintiffs potential market. 28 The broad statutory
language of fair use allows discretion in its application to various
circumstances. 29
B. ProtectingPropertyRights Under PropertyandLiability Rules
Property rights in intellectual property can be analyzed under
Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed's oft-cited framework
set forth in PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:One
View of the Cathedral." This framework analyzes whether
entitlements, or property rights, should be subject to property,
Which rule is appropriate
liability, or inalienability rules.'
depends on which rule maximizes efficiency.32 Efficiency, in a
general sense, is achieved when rights and resources are allocated
Allocational efficiency
to the users who value it most."
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985)).
27. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
28. § 107(l)-(4).
29. See Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What's So Fair About Fair
Use?, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y U.S.A. 513, 515 (1999) ("In drafting the
Copyright Act, Congress pretty much punted on this issue, leaving it to courts to
just go on making case-by-case determinations as they had done all along. It did
list four factors for use to consider, but didn't say anything about what these
factors mean or how they should be weighted relative to each other.").
30. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 10.
31. Id. at 1089. We are only concerned with property and liability rules in
this context.
32. See id. at 1093-1101; Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and
Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2655, 2661 (1994) (This is grounded
in the Coase Theorem, which states that, assuming transaction costs are not
prohibitively high, regardless of the initial allocation, property will be
transferred to their highest-value use through bargaining); see infra note 35.
33. Merges, supra note 32, at 2661.
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maximizes the value of property thus increasing social welfare.34
When the cost of transferring property to the highest value user
becomes prohibitively high, the socially beneficial transaction will
not occur." Legal rules should therefore operate to overcome
failures in achieving the efficient allocation of rights and
resources.
Copyright can be freely distributed or transferred by any means
of conveyance to achieve efficient allocation.36 When person A
values rights in person B's copyright, A can obtain the rights in the
copyright by transacting with B. B will only part with the rights if
A values the rights more than B. When there are difficult barriers,
complexities, or high costs in transacting for the rights, or what
constitutes the intellectual property is vague, then a socially
beneficial transaction will not occur. The rights will not end up in
the hands of the person who values it most.
Now suppose A takes B's property instead of transacting with B.
In copyright, that is infringement. B then sues A to recover the
stolen property and wins. What remedy should B receive? Under
a property rule, B would get the property back, which in copyright
halts infringement, and prevents future infringement through an

34. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules:
An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REv. 713, 758 (1996) ("[L]egal rules are
used to promote the social objective of maximizing the value of things, which
means channeling things to the parties who place the highest value on them").
35. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15
(1960) ("In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover
who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal
and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up
the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of
the contract are being observed, and so on").
36. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (A "transfer of copyright ownership" is an
assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or
hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a
copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not
including a nonexclusive license); § 201(d)(1) ("The ownership of a copyright
may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance .... ); H.R.
Rep. No. 94-1476 at 123, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5738 (Under
the principle of unlimited alienability, "ownership of a copyright, or of any part
of it, may be transferred by any means of conveyance or by operation of law ...
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injunction. This is similar to traditional private property rights in
that injunctive relief is the most effective remedy to protect
property from being taken.3 ' The property will not be transferred
unless the parties mutually agree upon the value through a
voluntary transaction." When property owners have an absolute
right to exclude, the transaction is channeled into the
marketplace.39 Moreover, property rules require the least amount
of state intervention in determining the value of the property,
which reduces the court's administrative costs. 40 A mutually
agreeable value between A and B is socially desirable because it
ensures that property is at its highest value use. Therefore, when
parties are able to easily transact with each other, injunctive relief
should normally be allowed as a matter of course.4'
Under a liability rule, B would receive monetary damages for
the taking, much like a breach of contract or tort suit. A liability
rule allows the use of an entitlement for an objectively determined
value, usually decided by the court. 42 A liability rule is favored
when beneficial transfers do not occur due to prohibitively high
barriers and costs to establishing the value.43 That value, however,
is not necessarily one that the buyer would have accepted." Only
rarely can a court determine the values of competing uses
accurately, especially when subjective elements are involved. 45 If
B values the rights more than A, yet A can still take the property,
then the property is not put to its most valuable use.
The determination as to which rule leads to the efficient
allocation of rights and resources depends on the extent and nature

37. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 10, at 1105-06.
3 8. Id.
39. POSNER, supra note 17, at 69 ("The law of trespass, by refusing to
consider the value of the invader's activity, channels the transaction into the
market, where it belongs").
40. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 10, at 1092.
41. POSNER, supra note 17, at 69.

42. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 10, at 1092.
43. Id. at 1106.
44. Id. at 1108.
45. POSNER, supra note 17, at 70. ("[C]ourts are likely to underestimate
damages systematically, because the plaintiff has the burden of proof and highly
speculative evidence is disallowed").
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of transaction costs.46 Generally, to transfer the rights or to license
the rights of any work, the rights holder and the potential user must
transact through negotiations to reach a mutually satisfactory
value.47 Typically, a property rule is favored when there are fewer
parties, difficult valuation problems, and generally low costs to
transacting.48 By contrast, a liability rule is favored when there are
many parties, a likelihood of strategic bargaining, and otherwise
high transaction costs.49 When there are only two parties, and the
value of the property at issue is found in its subjective elements,
then a property rule is more efficient.
C. PreliminaryInjunctions in General
When a copyright holder claims that her work has been
infringed, she will often need more immediate protection than a
final injunction to prevent ongoing infringement."o Preliminary
injunctions also serve to maintain the status quo until a full trial
can be held to determine the scope of rights." Sections 502 and
503 of the Copyright Act authorize courts to grant temporary
restraining orders, temporary injunctions, and impoundment
orders. 52 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize courts to
grant temporary restraining orders under Rule 65(b)."
46. See Mark A. Lemley & Philip Weiser, Should Propertyor Liability Rules
Govern Information, 85 TEX. L. REv. 783, 786-87 (2007) (noting that
transaction costs generally include the difficulty and expense of having to
negotiate multiple deals, and the risk that some sellers will engage in strategic
behavior to try to increase their share of the rents); Merges, supra note 32, at
2664; see supra note 35.
47. POSNER, supra note 17, at 42.

48. Merges, supra note 32, at 2664.
49. Id.
50. 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT

§ 11.1, at 11:4 (2d ed. &

Supp. 2005).
51. See NIMMER, supra note 26, at § 14.06[A][1][a]; Warner Bros. Inc. v.
Dae Rim Trading, Inc., 877 F.2d 1120, 1125 (2d Cir. 1989) ("The purpose of a
temporary restraining order is to preserve an existing situation in statu quo until
the court has an opportunity to pass upon the merits of the demand for a
preliminary injunction").
52. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 503 (2006).
53. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
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A preliminary injunction is considered an "extraordinary
remedy."S4 The eBay Court explained that the remedy should
never be awarded as a right." Still, preliminary injunctions have
historically been more readily available in copyright cases than in
any other intellectual property context, such as in patents or
trademarks."
Even since eBay, where the Court held that
injunctions do not automatically follow a finding of infringement,
lower courts applying the traditional equitable principles have
generally granted injunctions for the copyright owner upon a
showing of infringement; that is, the courts have upheld strong
property rules for copyright owners."
A preliminary injunction is awarded if compensatory remedies
are unavailable or inadequate." Under either preliminary or final
injunction analysis, remedies are inadequate when the risk of
ongoing harm is irreparable, and will continue to accrue during the
course of litigation. Irreparable harm is characterized as harm that
will be difficult to undo after the fact with monetary remedies."
In copyright, irreparable harm has commonly been presumed
upon a finding of infringement on the substantive merits. The
presumption seems appropriate where the copyrighted work is an
expressive work, as opposed to a work that is functional in nature
because functional works have a more objective value.60 Much of
54. See Winter v. Nat'1 Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 376 (2008)
("A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy .... ).
55. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392-93 (noting that
the creation of a right and the remedy for violations of that right are separate and
distinct provisions); 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006) (A court "may" grant injunctive
relief).
56. NIMMER, supra note 26, at § 14.06[A][1][b] (noting that despite their
extraordinary nature, "in actual practice their issuance is actually ordinary, even
common place").
57. See Phillips, supra note 9, at 423 & 423, n. 113 (noting all but two
copyright cases after eBay granted an injunction).
58. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 77 (citing eBay, 547 U.S. at 391).
59. Id. at 81. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 50, § 11.1.1, at 11:5-6 (noting
"there is little case law indicating the degree of irreparable harm that a plaintiff
must demonstrate to obtain a [temporary injunction]").
60. See, e.g., Nat'l Med. Care, Inc. v. Espiritu, 284 F. Supp. 2d 424, 432
(2003) (comparing the value of copyrighted works that are functional in nature
with those that derive value in artistic or creative elements).
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the value in an expressive work is based on subjective elements
and thus inherently difficult to calculate.' This is why the courts
have simply presumed that harm is irreparable when infringement
is shown.
Ideally, preliminary injunctions operate to prevent harm from
accruing, or at least encourage both parties to negotiate and
mutually agree on the value of the copyrighted work. But this
relief can be oppressively applied by courts6 2 or utilized in an
opportunistic manner by the copyright holder.63 Preliminary
injunctions may be overly oppressive in cases in which the
infringer has merely borrowed a minimal amount of protected
elements from another work and incorporated them into a larger,
original work of her own.' Even a weak lawsuit can have the
effect of forcing the alleged infringer to abandon what may have
been a substantial investment in original authorship because the
scope of plaintiffs rights are uncertain." Preliminary injunctions
can also force the infringer to settle with the copyright owner on
terms that may sacrifice some or all of the value of the infringer's
own original authorship.6 6 Since the copyright holder possesses a
monopoly over the rights, no settlement can be reached when the
author acts as a holdout by refusing to negotiate.67 This may
61. See POSNER, supra note 17, at 70.

62. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 50, § 11.0, at 11:1 (characterizing injunctive
relief as "coercive").
63. See Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive
IntellectualProperty Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REv. 509, 512 (2003) (noting that a
plaintiff may file a weak lawsuit to impair the defendant's performance in their
shared market, or exclude altogether).
64. Id. See, e.g., Salinger, 607 F.3d at 73-74 (analyzing Colting's fair use
defense).
65. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 50, § 11.0, at 11:3; Meurer, supra note 63, at
513 (noting that the defendant will likely settle because copyright suits have a
high variance in the scope of rights granted).
66. Id. See, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, 650 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (Leval, J.), rev'd, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890
(1987) (District Court Judge Leval denied a preliminary injunction for a work
that quoted unpublished sections of Salinger's works. The Court of Appeals
granted the preliminary injunction and the sections were removed).
67. See Daniel Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEX. L. REv. 253, 265-66
(2009) (noting that U.S. Antitrust law generally does not impose an obligation
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effectively exclude the defendant from the plaintiffs market."
Another controversial issue with preliminary injunctions is that
they may operate as an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.6 9
Courts generally do not allow preliminary relief when its purpose
is to restrict otherwise free speech." An injunction against speech
must await a judicial determination that the speech in
constitutionally unprotected." Consequently, when preliminary
relief is presumptively awarded prior to the establishment of
rights, it may violate the defendant's right to free speech under the
First Amendment.
The traditional preliminary injunction standard in copyright
cases has presumed irreparable harm has a matter of almost
categorical right when the plaintiff has established a reasonable
probability of success on the merits.7 2 Like many circuits, the
Second Circuit traditionally issued preliminary injunctions in
copyright cases upon a finding of "(a) irreparable harm and (b)
to license intellectual property on even dominant intellectual property rights
holders).
68. Meurer, supra note 63, at 512-13.
69. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech
and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998)
(asserting that intellectual property should not be exempted from conventional
First Amendment scrutiny and that damage remedies should be favored).
70. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714
(1971) ("Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity").
71. See Andrew Beckerman, PriorRestraints and IntellectualProperty: The
Clash between Intellectual Property and the First Amendment from an
Economic Perspective, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 20-21
(2001) ("The goal of injunctive relief is to restrict dissemination of intellectual
property. However, intellectual property comprises information and ideas; any
restriction on dissemination may be in conflict with the underlying thrust of the
First Amendment, which seeks to prohibit restrictions on speech. This raises a
fundamental conflict based on the question of whether intellectual property
should be treated as property or as speech.").
72. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 50, § 11.1.2, at 11:13-14. See, e.g., Video Trip
Corp., 866 F.2d at 51-52 ("[The] existence of irreparable injury is presumed
upon a showing of a prima facie case of copyright infringement"); see also
Richard Feiner & Co. v. Turner Entm't Co., 98 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 1996); ABKCO
Music, Inc. v. Stellar Records, Inc., 96 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 1996); Hasbro Bradley,
Inc. v. Sparkle Toys, Inc., 780 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1985).

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol21/iss2/6

12

Dozeman: Salinger and eBay: When Equitable Considerations Undermine Exclus

2011]

SALINGER AND EBAY

335

either (1) likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently
serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground
for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward
As noted in
the party requesting the preliminary relief.""
Salinger, "the overwhelming majority of decisions addressing
injunction motions have focused solely on whether the plaintiff has
shown a likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm,
rather than on balancing the hardships.74
D. eBay v. MercExchange L.L. C. 's Effect on Injunctive Relief
The United States Supreme Court decision in eBay v.
MercExchange L.L.C. has led courts to reject the presumption
standard, or any general or categorical rule for that matter. In
eBay, a patent infringement case, the Court was presented with the
issue of whether a permanent injunction should automatically
follow a finding of infringement." The Court held that injunctions
do not automatically follow and that the lower courts must apply
the "well-established" four-factor test 76 historically employed by
courts of equity. Although the Court applied that standard to a
permanent injunction in a patent case, the decision has been
interpreted as applying to both permanent and preliminary
injunctions in copyright cases.
eBay involved a business method patent for the operation of
MercExchange L.L.C., the patent
electronic marketplaces."
73. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 75 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing NXIVM Corp.
v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 2004); ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Stellar
Records, Inc., 96 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 1996); Video Trip Corp. v. Lighting Video,
Inc., 866 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1989); Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript
Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977)).
74. Id. at 75, n.5.
75. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
76. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
77. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
78. See Salinger, 607 F.3d at 78-79 (citing Winter v. Nat'l Res. Def.
Counsel, 129 S. Ct. 365, 375-76 (2008)); see also id. at 77, n.6 (illustrating the
Second Circuit's district court split concerning whether eBay governs
preliminary injunctions in copyright).
79. eBay, 547 U.S. at 390 (The patent in dispute was U.S. Patent No.
5,845,265, which facilitated the sale of goods between private individuals).
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holder, and eBay, an Internet auction website, failed to reach a
license agreement for the use of the patent.80 eBay continued to
use the patent and was subsequently sued for infringement." After
finding that eBay infringed, the district court denied
MercExchange L.L.C.'s motion for permanent injunctive relief.8 2
The court of appeals reversed stating that there is a "general rule
that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent
infringement absent exceptional circumstances.""
On grant of writ of certiorari, a unanimous Supreme Court stated
that general rules are contrary to the principles of equity that have
traditionally guided courts.84 The Court first stated that wellestablished principles of equity apply with equal force to disputes
arising under the Patent Act." Therefore, a permanent injunction
is only appropriate when a plaintiff has demonstrated:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that
remedies available at law, such as monetary
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a
remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the
public interest would not be disserved by a
permanent injunction.8 6
The Court opined that "a major departure from the long tradition
of equity practice should not be lightly implied."" Under the
Patent Act, "injunctions 'may' issue 'in accordance with the
principles of equity.""' And the creation of a right is distinct from
80. Id
8 1. Id.
82. Id. (citing eBay v. MercExchange L.L.C., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695 (2003)).
83. Id. at 391 (quoting eBay v. MercExchange L.L.C., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339
(2005)).
84. Id. at 393-94.
85. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
86. Id
87. Id (quoting Weinberg v. Romero-Barcelo, 465 U.S. 305, 320 (1982)).
88. Id at 392 (citing 35 U.S.C § 283) ("The several courts having
jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions in accordance with the
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the provision of remedies for violations of that right." Thus,
injunctive relief may not be granted as a matter of course or under
categorical rules, such as an automatic grant of injunctive relief
upon a finding of infringement.90
For additional support, the Court noted that this approach shares
similarities with injunctions under the Copyright Act." Both
patent and copyright holders posses the right to exclude,92 and both
Acts provide that courts may grant injunctive relief on such terms
as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a
copyright.9 3
Importantly, the Court explained that it "has
consistently rejected invitations to replace traditional equitable
considerations with a rule that an injunction automatically follows
[copyright infringement]."9
The case was remanded because neither the district court nor the
court of appeals had applied the traditional equity principles
properly because both used categorical rules in their
determinations. The district court used a categorical denial; the
court of appeals used a categorical grant.96
In Chief Justice Roberts' concurrence, he noted that courts have
historically granted injunctive relief upon a finding of
infringement because of the "difficulty of protecting a right to
exclude through monetary remedies."9 7 The court's "discretion is
not whim, and limiting discretion according to legal standards
helps promote the basic principle of justice that like cases should
be decided."" When applying those standards, "a page of history

principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on
such terms as the court deems reasonable").
89. Id. at 392 ("The creation of a right is distinct from the provision of
remedies for violations of that right").
90. Id. at 393-94.
91. eBay, 547 U.S. at 392-93.
92. Id. at 392 (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).
93. Id. at 392 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006)).
94. Id. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).

95. eBay, 547 U.S. at 393.
96. Id. at 394.
97. Id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
98. Id. (quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005)).
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is worth a volume of logic."9 9
Justice Kennedy's concurrence reiterated that the "right to
exclude does not dictate the remedy for a violation of that right."' 0
The fact that history has shown that injunctions are granted in the
majority of cases upon a finding of infringement merely illustrates
the result of the four-factor test."o' He expressed concern over nonpracticing entities or patent trolls, defined as patent holders who
extort high licensing fees by threatening suit.'O2
III. SUBJECT OPINION: SALINGER V. COLTING

In 2009 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with
the issue of whether a preliminary injunction in copyright should
be granted on showing of a likelihood of success on the merits."'
In Salinger v. Colting, Plaintiff-Appellee J.D. Salinger," author of
The Catcher in the Rye ("Catcher"), brought a copyright
infringement and unfair competition suit against DefendantAppellant Fredrick Coltingo' and his publishers.'" Colting wrote
and published a novel entitled 60 Years Later: Coming Through
the Rye ("60 Years Later"), which Salinger claimed was a
derivative of Catcher.'o The district court granted Salinger's
99. Id. (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)
(Holmes, J.)).
100. Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
101. eBay, 547 U.S. at 396.
102. Id. (citing FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, 38-39 (Oct.
2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf) ("An
industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing
and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees").
103. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d. 68, 71 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Archive of
Columns on Fredrick Colting, http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/tag/fredrikcolting/ (last visited February 20, 2011).
104. See Archive of Articles on J.D. Salinger, http://topics.nytimes.com/
top/reference/timestopics/people/s/j d salinger/index.html (last visited March
21, 2010).
105. Id. at 71 (Colting's pen name is John David California).
106. Id. at 70 (Windupbird Publishing, Ltd., Nicotext A.B., and ABP Inc.).
107. Id. A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as a . . . fictionalization . . . or any other form in which a work may
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motion for a preliminary injunction based on the Second Circuit's
"longstanding standard" that upon a prima facie showing of
copyright infringement, irreparable harm is presumed and an
injunction will follow.'" The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court's finding of infringement, yet remanded
holding that the presumption standard is contrary to eBay v.
MercExchange L.L. C.'s injunction standard.'"
A. Facts and ProceduralHistory
In 1951 Salinger published Catcher, a coming-of-age story
about a sixteen year old boy named Holden Caulfied."o Colting's
60 Years Later is the story of a seventy-six year old Holden
Caulfield, referred to as Mr. C, and a fictionalized Salinger."'
Salinger's infringement claim outlined extensive similarities in
character and content.'12 He also pointed to the marketing efforts of
60 Years Later as a sequel of Catcher."3 In response, Colting
be recast, transformed, or adapted. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). A work consisting
of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which,
as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work." §
101.
108. Id. at 74.
109. See id. at 72-74.
110. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 70. Holden Caulfield wanders through New York
City for several days after being expelled from school. Id. During his journey
he becomes disillusioned with humanity and considers living as a recluse. Id.
His younger sister Phoebe dissuades him from self-exile. Id. The novel has
enjoyed enormous success, selling over thirty-five million copies. Id. Unlike
his character Holden, Salinger remained a recluse, yet litigiously protected his
copyright interests in Catcher. Id.
111. Id. at 72 (The gist of the novel is Salinger is haunted by Holden so he
brings him back to life to kill him).
112. Id. First, Mr. C is Holden Caulfield, evident by references to events
from Holden's story and notable eccentricities. Id. Second, Mr. C and Holden
share similar story lines: they both "leave an institution, wander around New
York City for several days, reconnect with old friends, find happiness with
Phoebe, and ultimately returning to a different institution." Id. Third, there are
broader structural similarities. Id.
113. Id. The back cover of 60 Years Later displayed a description stating it
is "a marvelous sequel to one of our most beloved classics." Id. Also, Colting
described 60 Years Later as "[j]ust like the first novel .... He's still Holden
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argued that his novel was not a sequel, but a critical examination
of Holden and Salinger."14 He illustrated differences in each
novel's narration and characters."' Colting also relied on two
literary experts to show that 60 Years Later is a "metacommentary""'6 and "critique""' of Catcher and Holden. In light
of these characterizations, Colting claimed that 60 Years Later fell
under the fair use defense."'
The district court was not persuaded by Colting's fair use
defense. Under the first factor, the "purpose and character of the
use,"l' the court found that 60 Years Later as a whole lacked
"sufficient non-parodic transformative value."' 20 Although there
was some transformative value in the fictionalized character of
Salinger, it was insufficient to render the entire novel
transformative. 2 ' The second fair use factor, "the nature of the
copyrighted work,"'22 favored Salinger because Catcher is a
"creative expression for public dissemination that falls within the
core of the copyright's protective purposes. "123 The third factor,
Caulfield, and has a particular view on things." Id. (citing Alison Flood,
Catcher in the Rye Sequel Published, but Not by Salinger, Guardian, May 14,
2009).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 72 (Case Western Reserve University Professor
Martha Woodmansee stated that "[60 Years Later] pursues critical reflection on
J.D. Salinger and [Catcher]" in the form of a novel, similar to how literary
scholars do in scholarly journals).
117. Id. (University of Tulsa College of Law Professor Robert Spoo claimed
that 60 Years Later was a sustained commentary on and critique of Catcher,
which revisits and analyzes the attitudes and assumptions of Holden).
118. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (Fair use provides limitations on exclusive
rights when the work is "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship,
or research . . . .").

119. § 107(1).
120. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 73.
121. Id. at 73-74 (finding it was not transformative for three reasons: first,
Colting had made public statements revealing his intention to write a Catcher
sequel; second, Salinger is a "minor and supporting character"; third, the ratio of
borrowed to transformative elements did not weigh in Colting's favor).
122. § 107(2).
123. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 74.
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"the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole,"l2 4 also favored Salinger because
Colting took more than necessary for the purposes of critique.125
Finally, for the fourth factor, "the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work," 26 the court
found that the work weighed slightly in Salinger's favor, relying
on the "value in the right not to authorize derivative works." 27
Without a valid fair use defense, Salinger established a prima
facie case of infringement. A preliminary injunction was granted
without discussing irreparable harm.128
B. The Second Circuit Court ofAppeal's Analysis
The court of appeals affirmed the finding of infringement, but
remanded the case to apply the eBay standard.129
The court first explained that preliminary injunctions have
traditionally been issued in copyright cases upon a finding of
irreparable harm, and either a likelihood of success on the merits
or sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a
fair ground for litigation along with a balance of hardships tipping
decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief.'"
Indeed, the majority of decisions focused on whether the plaintiff
had irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the merits."'
And once a plaintiff had shown a likelihood of success on the
Some
merits, irreparable harm was typically presumed. 3 2
decisions interpret the presumption to mean that a plaintiff likely
to prevail on the merits does not need to make a detailed showing
124. § 107(3).
125. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 74.
126. § 107(4).
127. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 74.
128. See id. at 73-74 (The district court found Salinger had valid copyrights
in Catcher and in Holden Caulfield, and there was substantial similarity
between Catcher and 60 Years Later, and between Holden and Mr. C, thus
meeting the elements of infringement).
129. Id. at 74-75, 84.
130. Id. at 75.
131. Id. at 75, n.5.
132. Id. at 75.
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of irreparable harm." Other decisions interpret the presumption
as though it applies automatically.134 Overall, most courts have
issued injunctions in copyright cases as a matter of course."'
Colting raised two arguments on appeal. Colting first argued
that the preliminary injunction standard was an unconstitutional
prior restraint on speech, and second, that the injunction was in
conflict with the Supreme Court's recent decision in eBay v.
MercExchange, L.L.C.16 The court agreed that eBay governs
preliminary injunctions in copyright, which required the case be
remanded, and the prior restraint on speech issue did not need to
be addressed.'37
eBay, like Salinger, involved the application of a general rule
that irreparable harm is presumed when infringement is found.'
The court reasoned that because nothing in the text or logic of
eBay limits the rule to patent cases, eBay strongly indicates that
the traditional principles of equity apply to injunctions in any
Further, the Supreme Court expressly relied on
context."'
copyright cases in eBay's reasoning.'40 The creation of a right,
through either the Patent Act or the Copyright Act, and the
remedies for violations of that right are separate and distinct
provisions. 4 ' The language of both Acts implies that injunctions
do not automatically follow infringement, which allows the courts
133. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 75. See, e.g., Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St.
Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977) (upon a prima facie showing of
infringement, allegations of irreparable injury need not be very detailed because
it can normally be presumed).
134. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 74. See, e.g., Rice v. Am. Program Bureau, 446
F.2d 685, 688 (2d Cir. 1971) ("It is ... well settled that when a prima facie case
is made out a preliminary injunction should issue without the showing of
irreparable injury, especially in actions . . . involving dramatico-musical

works").
135. Id.
136. Id. at 76.
13 7. Id.
138. Id. at 76.
139. Id. at 76 & 78, n.7 (noting there is no reason why eBay would not apply
with equal force to an injunction in any type of case).
140. Salinger,607 F.3d at 78.
141. Id. (Both the Patent Act and the Copyright Act provide courts may grant
injunctive relief); see 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2011).

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol21/iss2/6

20

Dozeman: Salinger and eBay: When Equitable Considerations Undermine Exclus

SALINGER AND EBAY

2011]

343

discretion by applying traditional equitable considerations.14 2
The court went on to state that obtaining a preliminary
injunction is not easier than obtaining a permanent injunction.'43
First, eBay relied on preliminary injunction cases.'" The standard
for preliminary and permanent injunctions is "essentially the
same."l 45 Second, the Supreme Court in Winter v. Natural
Resource Defense Counsel applied eBay to a preliminary
injunction.146 In Winter, the Ninth Circuit had preliminarily
enjoined the Navy's use of sonar in training exercises based on a
"strong" likelihood of success on the merits and the "possibility"
of irreparable harm.147
The Winter Court reversed while
emphasizing that the extraordinary remedy must be applied on a
case-by-case basis in which courts balance the competing claims
of injury and pay particular regard for the public consequences.14
In accord, the court gave guidance on how to apply the fourfactor test to preliminary injunctions in copyright cases. The first
factor remained the same in that a court must determine whether a
plaintiff has demonstrated "either (a) a likelihood of success on the
merits or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to
make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships
The court
tipping decidedly in the plaintiffs favor."l 4 9
acknowledged the difficulty of predicting the merits of a copyright
claim at the preliminary injunction hearing.' Furthermore, this is
considerably more difficult when the defendant raises a fair use
defense."

'

The court then discussed the second and third factors, the

142. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 78 (citing eBay, 547 U.S. at 392-93).
143. Id. at 78-79.
144. Id.
145. Id. (citing Amoco Prod. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 (1987)).
146. Id. at 79 (citing Winter v. Nat'1 Res. Def. Counsel, 129 S. Ct. 365, 37576 (2008)).
147. Id (quoting Winter, 129. S. Ct. at 375-76).
148. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 79 (quoting Winter, 129. S. Ct. at 375-76).
149. Id. at 80.
150. Id. at 80-81 (citing Lemley & Volokh, supra note 69, at 201-02).
151. Id. at 81 (citing Leval, supra note 13, at 1132); see also Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578, n.10 (1994)) (noting that "the fair
use enquiry often requires close questions of judgment").
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equitable factors, together: whether the plaintiff will suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction, and
the balance of hardships between the parties.' 52 Both factors
consider the irreparable harm to the parties' legal interests; that is,
the author's commercial interests' and their First Amendment
interest.'54 Harm is relevant to the extent that it is non-remedial
after final adjudication.' This type of harm is difficult to replace,
difficult to measure, or it is a loss that one should not be expected
to suffer."' Specifically in copyright cases, the harm may be
market confusion or the loss of First Amendment freedoms.'5 7
Yet, "prov[ing] the loss of sales due to infringement is . . .
And any amount of time of First
notoriously difficult."'
Amendment freedoms of is considered irreparable.'
The court cautiously recognized the influence of the historical
tendency to issue preliminary injunctions.'6 0 Citing empirical
studies, it acknowledged that courts have tended to grant
preliminary injunctions due to the inadequacies of legal remedies
for infringement.'' It also acknowledged the competing concerns
addressed in Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinions in eBay.'62
The final factor, rarely considered in the Second Circuit, is

152. Id. at 81.
153. See id. at 81, n.9 (citing New Era Publ'ns Int'l, APS v. Henry Holt &
Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1526 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("the justification of the
copyright law is the protection of the commercial interest of the artist/author ...
not to coddle artist vanity")).
154. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 81.

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 81.
158. Id. (quoting Omega Importing Corp. v. Petri--Kine Camera Co., 451
F.2d 1190, 1195 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, C.J.)).
159. Id. (quoting Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)).
160. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 82.
161. Id (citing H. Tomas G6mez-Arostegui, What History Teaches Us About
Copyright Injunctions and the Inadequate-Remedy-at-Law Requirement, 81 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1197, 1201 (2008) (noting that the historical record suggests that
legal remedies were deemed categorically inadequate).

162. Id. (citing eBay, 547 U.S. at 395).
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whether the public interest would be disserved by an injunction.16
The court restated that the object of copyright law is to promote
the store of knowledge available to the public, which may already
be satisfied by the plaintiffs contribution to the store of that
knowledge.'" First Amendment freedoms are also in the public's
interest. 65 An erroneous grant of a preliminary injunction risks
enjoining protected speech; in other cases the First Amendment
value is "virtually nonexistent."'6 6
Remanding the case back to the district court, the court affirmed
that Salinger was likely to succeed on the merits, and that Colting
did not have a valid fair use.'
IV. ANALYSIS
If a copyright holder wants to benefit from the right to exclude,
and faces irreparable harm from infringement, she must be
afforded injunctive relief. A preliminary injunction standard in
copyright should focus on the copyright owner's likelihood of
success on the merits, rather than a balance of the parties'
respective harms.
Information available in litigation at the
preliminary stage is speculative and incomplete in this context.'"
Further, a court is ill-positioned to accurately assess eventual
damages post-settlement or at trial because much of the value of a
copyright is subjective, rendering the irreparable harm requirement
illusory. Favoring a theory of property rule protection based on
the merits is socially preferable to a liability rule because it
protects an author's incentive to pursue ideas, and ensures that the
value of a copyrighted work is not undermined. By contrast,
application of a liability rule, which posits that the copyright
owner must vindicate her rights by obtaining a settlement or by
obtaining damages at trial, makes little sense given the
unpredictable nature of damages for copyright infringement as

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 82.
Id.
Id. at 82.
Salinger, 607 F.3d at 82-83.
Id. at 83.
POSNER, supra note 17, at 596.
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they extend into the future. The infringement and fair use analysis
can offer the same benefits and efficiencies that a liability rule
would offer. Thus, the goals of copyright and the protections
afforded to copyright holders are better served through a property
rule at the preliminary stage.
eBay stated that the grant of a right to exclude and the remedy
for its violation are separate and distinct provisions, turning on
equitable considerations." This implies that the right to exclude is
not absolute. Rather, when equitable considerations control, the
right to exclude can be outweighed by other factors, which favors
monetary compensation determined ex post. Though equitable
considerations may better serve patents and their primarily
utilitarian function, the approach is not necessarily proper in the
copyright context.
A. Copyright Protection Under PropertyRules Protects the Value
of Copyrighted Works
The efficient allocation of copyrights is best promoted under a
property rule, as opposed to a liability rule because transaction
costs are low.' Property rules are more appropriate for situations
in which there are fewer parties, the value of the entitlement is
difficult to determine, and transaction costs are otherwise low."'
Likewise, copyright favors a property rule because there are
typically two parties, and the value of a copyright is difficult for

the courts to determine.172
Most importantly, the courts are ill-equipped to accurately and
efficiently determine the value of expressive works. Copyrighted
works, especially artistic or creative works, have a specialized
nature that makes their valuation difficult.'73 Artistic or creative
169. 547 U.S. at 392.
170. See Merges, supra note 32, at 2664.
171. Id.
172. See id. (noting that courts are simply not well-situated to value
copyright).
173. POSNER, supra note 17, at 69 ("The ... realistic assumption is that only
rarely can a court determine the values of competing uses accurately, especially
when subjective values are involved"); Merges, supra note 31, at 2664 ("[A]
court called on to set the terms of the exchange would have a difficult time
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works derive much of their value in subjective or aesthetic
elements, which are best determined in the marketplace. Each
copyrighted work is substantively required to be original and
therefore unique; there is no common value among them.174
Moreover, courts would have to account for the complex nature in
which these works are traded and disseminated.'7 History has
illustrated the unpredictable nature of markets for expressive
works through time.' Therefore, a property rule that encourages
the parties to transact would present a more accurate value of the
copyright through the individual assessment in the subjective
aesthetic elements of a work. Simply put, the party who values the
rights in a particular copyrighted work more will acquire the rights
through negotiation, which will maximize the value of the work.
When monetary damages are the favored remedy over injunctive
relief, infringers can calculate the damage beforehand and infringe
in a cost effective way. Some courts have explicitly struck down
the liability rule approach as an "infringe now, pay later"
strategy."'7 This has the potential to allow the court to disregard
the substantive law because it considers factors other than legal
rights.'
Moreover, without accurate information, there is a risk
that damage may be set below the actual level of harm. This
doing so quickly and cheaply, given the specialized nature of the assets and the
varied and complex business environments in which they are deployed.").
174. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 34, at 759-60 (When the owner and taker
evaluate similar characteristics, things have either a common value or a
component value. In copyright, the work is more likely to have an idiosyncratic
value between the owner and taker).
175. See Merges, supra note 32, at 2664-65. See, e.g., Sheldon v. MetroGoldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390 (1940) (The court had to value the
contributions made by a copyrighted play to a film that incorporated some of its
plot elements).
176. See Michael J. Clark, The Perfect Fake: Creativity,Forgery,Art and the
Law, 15 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 1, 12 (2004) (noting that from
1960 to 1975, the value of French Impressionist works rose 230%, which in turn
saw an increase in the value of much lesser known works).
177. Woods v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 920 F.Supp. 62, 65 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) ("Copyright infringement can be expensive. The Copyright Law does not
condone a practice of infringe now, pay later").
178. See John Leubsdorf, PreliminaryInjunctions: In Defense Of The Merits,
76 FORDHAM L. R-Ev. 33, 36-37 (2007).
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would encourage increased infringement further undermining the
right to exclude.' 79
The inability of copyright holders and licensors to reach an
agreement has been used to justify compulsory licensing.'s A
compulsory license scheme is a liability rule that coerces the rights
holder to license rights for a predetermined rate."'

This is

appropriate only when transaction costs preclude the formation of
a market for certain rights or resources, which require statutorily
assisted transactions.'82 The market for derivative works of
Catcher remains untouched, which may never exist without a
liability rule regime. But an important distinction is that the
derivative market is not the same as a primary market. The
statutory licensing scheme was designed for rebroadcast rights and
public dissemination, not the authorization of sequels.
Yet, compulsory licensing can undermine an important incentive
for producers and users to invest in institutions that reduce the cost
of transacting.'
One example is the formation of Performing
Rights Societies ("PROs"). PROs function as a voluntary liability
rule for rights holders in the form of an institution that carries out
intellectual property transactions through blanket licenses.'8 4 A
strong property rule provides a baseline for the incentive to
contract into liability rules.' Thus, property rules can incentivize
rights holders to invest in institutions where the value is still
determined among the users, rather than the state.
Another characteristic of copyright that favors the adoption of
property rules is the nature of transaction costs. There are
typically two parties involved (a copyright holder and potential
179. Merges, supra note 32, at 2666-67 ("Without accurate information, the
damages may be set below the actual level of harm, encouraging the [infringer]
to engage in an excessive level of activity . . . .").
180. Id. at 2668; see 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006).
18 1. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 2662 (noting that institutions such as American Society of
Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) and patent pools arise when
firms modify the strong property rule baseline of intellectual property law by
contracting into liability rules).
184. Id. at 2669.
185. Merges, supra note 32, at 2662.
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user), which is considered a low transaction barrier.'" This is
evident in Salinger in which there were two parties involved in a
dispute over the right to use copyrighted elements of Catcher.'7
These two parties could easily engage in discussions, albeit likely
through their attorneys, and formulate a mutually beneficial
solution between them. It is doubtful that the cost of engaging in
such discussion would be overly burdensome.
When there are two parties transacting there are problems
particular to a bilateral monopoly.'" A bilateral monopoly occurs
when two parties can only negotiate with one another; only one
plaintiff can settle with one defendant.'" Bargaining to reach an
agreement may become prohibitively expensive when a mutually
satisfactory settlement is not reached.'90 When a beneficial
transaction does not occur, or the transaction costs between the
parties exceeds the gains of the transaction, it results in social
waste. 9 ' The bilateral monopoly scenario is illustrated in Salinger.
Salinger has refused to allow the use of his works without even the
possibility of negotiating.'9 2 A lack of useful derivative works may
have resulted in depriving public demand for those works. If the
market is under served by Salinger's holdout behavior, Salinger's
copyrights may not be allocated efficiently. Still it could just as
likely be said that Salinger values the copyright more than Colting.
In any event, this scenario is theoretical and based on anecdotal
assumptions. Just like the valuation of the copyright and the
calculation of harm, the societal consequences of Salinger's
holdout behavior are speculative.
Whatever negative consequences result from Salinger's refusal
to negotiate, that behavior must be reconciled with Salinger's right
to exclude and First Amendment right in not speaking. A liability
186. Id.
187. See Salinger,607 F.3d at 70.
188. POSNER, supra note 17, at 62.

189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See Salinger, 607 F.3d at 71 ("Salinger has not published since 1965
and has never authorized any new narrative involving Holden or any work
derivative of Catcher. [He] has never permitted, and has explicitly instructed
his lawyers not to allow, adaptations of his works").
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rule would allow Colting to use Salinger's copyright for monetary
damages determined by the court. In Patents, the courts are
becoming aware of the negative effects of rights holders refusing
to negotiate. 9 3 Justice Kennedy's concurrence in eBay addressed
this very problem of non-practicing entities seeking exorbitant
Evidence of this
licensing fees from potential licensees.194
behavior in copyright is rare. Copyrighted works and patents
operate in different markets, which raise different issues, such as
constitutionally protected speech. The copyright market as a
whole has not become a victim of copyright trolls.'
Moreover,
patent law does not provide a fair use equivalent.'
In sum, a property rule is preferable at the preliminary stage
because it maintains the incentive to negotiate a mutually
agreeable value to the work. It also ensures the courts will neither
undervalue nor overvalue works, which would undermine the
utilitarian justifications for copyright. Copyrights are put to their
highest value use when parties transact. "It would be a dangerous
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.""

193. See eBay v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (citing FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE

38-39
(Oct. 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf)).
194. Id. ("An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a
basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining
licensing fees").
195. See Lionel Bently, People v. The Author: From the Death Penalty to
Community Service, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 11-12 (2008) (discussing early
"copyright troll" behavior with public performance rights and subsequent
changes in Performing Rights Societies).
196. See Lorelei Ritchie De Larena, What Copyright Teaches Patent Law
About "FairUse" and Why Universities Are Ignoring the Lesson, 84 OR. L.
REV. 779, 809-18 (2005) (proposing a hybrid "fair" patent system, including a
statutory copyright-style balancing test, a grant of royalty-bearing compulsory
license, and injunctive relief); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine ofFair
Use in PatentLaw, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1203 (2000) (arguing for a patent
fair use doctrine that would still require compensation).
197. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithography Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903)
(Holmes, J.).
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, pp
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B. PropertyRules Better Serve Copyright Goals Because Harm is
Difficult to Assess
Weighing harm, like determining objective value, is a difficult
role for a court to perform in copyright infringement cases.
Salinger noted two types of irreparable harm that a party may
claim: harm to property interest and loss of First Amendment
freedoms.
The first harm is to the plaintiffs property interest caused by
market confusion and consequent loss of sales."' Proving loss of
sales, however, is "notoriously difficult," which is why courts have
tended to issue injunctions in this context.19 To succeed, Salinger
would have to show that 60 Years Later became a substitute
2 00
Salinger would have to show consumers
product for Catcher.
would purchase 60 Years Later instead of Catcher. It is also
feasible that a derivative work may create a positive effect or
benefit on the market for Catcher.20 ' Either way, the difficulty for
both parties and the court is apparent. Without some empirical
evidence, harm and benefit are speculative.
The second harm is the loss of First Amendment freedoms. That
harm is Salinger's right not to be spoken for vicariously through
another.202 Colting exploited Salinger's copyright by using a
20 3
Because Salinger was found to
substantial amount of Catcher.
have a likelihood of success on the merits, Colting was speaking,
in a First Amendment sense, for Salinger through the derivative
work. Unlike showing market confusion, Salinger could simply

198. Salinger,607 F.3d at 34.
199. Id. (quoting Omega Importing Corp. v. Petri--Kine Camera Co., 451
F.2d 1190, 1195 (2d Cir. 1971).
200. POSNER, supra note 17, at 44 (explaining that a product is a substitute if
a fall in its price will cause the quantity demanded of the other product to fall).
201. See Douglas Lichtman, IrreparableBenefits, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET
PART 377 (2007), http://yalelawjoumal.org/2007/05/06/lichtman.html (arguing
that irreparable benefits should be considered by the courts for injunctions
because they are unintentional, difficult to reverse, affect distribution and
incentives, and affect party's behavior during litigation).
202. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 81.
203. Id. at 83 ("[W]e affirm the District Court's finding that Catcher and 60
Years Later are substantially similar").
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claim that he would not like to speak. Competing claims of First
Amendment harm require that the court balance the interests and
make a value determination. Since each party's First Amendment
right is equal, the inquiry turns to the merits, or the public interest
factor for that determination. The substantive requirements of
infringement harmonize with the public interest factor in that
situation because the public has an interest in the court following
the substantive law. Finding otherwise may violate due process by
undermining the rights conferred by law.2" Thus, the inquiry is
again reduced to a likelihood of success on the merits. And as
Commentator Nimmer puts it, "if a plaintiff establishes a
likelihood of success on the merits of a copyright infringement
claim, it would seem erroneous to deny a preliminary injunction
simply because actual damages cannot be precisely calculated ...
">205

The difficulty in assessing these harms is further compounded
by the information presented at the preliminary stage; it is often
incomplete and inaccurate. As noted in Salinger, "[p]reparation
for a typical copyright trial, even a bench trial, takes many months;
the arguments concerning substantially similarity and fair use of
another, are sophisticated and fact-intensive." 206 Complexity of
evidence and subjective determinations would require the court to
make a difficult judgment, thus the risk of error is great.207
Weighing speculative evidence of harm in this context may not
even be admissible.20 8
Therefore, when a likelihood of success on the merits is shown,
it is easy to justify enjoining such activity. 209 Even a presumption
204. Leubsdorf, supra note 178, at 37 ("If courts disregard the substantive
law, a plaintiff willing to pay can automatically obtain injunctive relief under
the liability rule so long as the plaintiff's case is not frivolous").
205. NIMMER, supra note 26, at § 14.06[A][3][d].
206. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 80-81 (quoting Lemley & Volokh, supra note 69,
at 201-02).
207. POSNER, supra note 17, at 596 (noting that one of the objectives of the
procedural system is to minimize the cost of erroneous judicial decisions. When
"the judge is being asked to rule in a hurry, on the basis of incomplete
information, the risk of error is great").
208. Id. at 70; see supra note 45.
209. Leval, supra note 13, at 1132.
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of irreparable harm is probably unnecessary; it merely simplifies
and reduces the cost of proving what could be shown without it. 2 10
C. The Fair Use Defense Should Weigh More Heavily at the
PreliminaryStage
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Salinger stated that
preliminary injunctions should not be easier than obtaining a
permanent injunction.2 1 1 It has been argued thus far that the
preliminary injunction standard should be based on a likelihood of
success on the merits. Accordingly, the merits should be the focus
of both parties, meaning the defendant should be allowed to
overcome the presumption favoring the copyright owner with a
valid fair use defense. The fair use defense can facilitate the
efficient allocation of rights and resources similar to a liability rule
when transaction costs are high, or when the public is being
deprived of useful works. Fair use analysis is also more sensitive
to the unique context and subjective nature of copyrighted works
where a one-size-fits-all injunction standard fails.
Fair use protects secondary creativity, which is important
because most, if not all works draw elements from existing
knowledge. Fair use limits the scope of copyright in furtherance
of this utilitarian objective to increase the progress of science and
useful arts.m' Judge Leval of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
a proponent of a more consistent fair use standard, has argued that
"[f]air use should not be considered a bizarre, occasionally
tolerated departure from the grand conception of the copyright
2 " The function of fair use is "integral to copyright's
monopoly."m
objectives, which leads to a coherent useful set of principles."2 14
Yet a "simple definition" is difficult to articulate. 2 15 Fair use "must
be of a character that serves the copyright objective of stimulating

210. Id.
211. Salinger,607 F.3d at 78 (noting that eBay, as reinforced by Winter, does
not permit an "easier" grant of a preliminary than of a permanent injunction).
212. See Leval, supra note 13, at 1105.
213. Id. at I110.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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productive thought and public instruction without excessively
diminishing the incentives for creativity." 216
Fair use can remedy a situation in which the transaction costs of
negotiating with the copyright owner for permission exceed the
value of the user seeking permission.2 17 A fair use standard that
can overcome the problem of idiosyncratic values bypasses the
need to adopt a liability rule, thus maintaining the property rule
incentives for the original copyright holder.2 18 It is clear that
Salinger would not grant permission to use his copyright in any
situation. 2 19 Accordingly, Colting would need to use the fair use
defense to show 60 Years Later is outside the scope of Salinger's
copyright.
The district court found that the fair use defense was likely to
fail.220 Interestingly, in addition to its fair use analyses, the court
pointed to Colting's marketing attempts to position 60 Years Later
as a sequel. 22 ' This may have been a substantial factor in Colting's
failure. Infringement of this nature not only free rides on
Salinger's publicity, but it also undercuts the market, and deprives
the copyright owner of the rewards of his creation. 222 Fair use does
not excuse users who offer disingenuous ad hoc excuses.
Fair use can also apply when the individual's use of copyrighted
material is thought to generate some positive value to society,
which is appropriate given the utilitarian justifications for
copyright.223 The positive social value may include the value
216. Id.
217. See Thomas Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA
L. REv. 1271, 1277 (2008) (arguing the user should be permitted to engage in
unauthorized use in cases in which the transaction costs of bargaining for use
discourage the user from seeking permission).
218. Id.
219. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 71 ("[Salinger] has explicitly instructed his
lawyers not to allow[] adaptations of his works").
220. Id. at 73.
221. Id. at 72; see supra note 113.
222. See Leval, supra note 13, at 1132 ("[Infringers] free-ride on the
copyright owner's publicity, undercut the market, and deprive the copyright
owner of the rewards of his creation. Allowing this practice to flourish destroys
the incentive to create and thus deprives the public of the benefits copyright was
designed to secure.").
223. Cotter, supra note 217, at 1280 (noting that fair use should apply when
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criticism, education purposes, news reporting, or any other
purposes listed under section 107 of the Copyright Act. 224 The
social value must exceed the value to the copyright owner in
preventing the unauthorized use. In Salinger, the two statements
Colting offered from literary experts Professor Woodmansee and
Professor Spoo would have to show that the novel created a
positive social benefit. Professor Woodmansee described the work
as a "meta-commentary," 2 25 while Professor Spoo found the novel
to be a "commentary on and critique of Catcher."226 The district
court found these characterizations unpersuasive. Colting claimed
it was a commentary only after he previously referenced the work
as a sequel.227 Ultimately, the district court found that the social
value in 60 Years Later, as analyzed through fair use, did not
outweigh the value of the work to Salinger.
In sum, fair use provides the defendant a tool for weakening the
likelihood of the plaintiffs success on the merits, or escape the
infringement claim altogether. It also provides the courts with a
framework of analysis that can be used to prevent opportunistic
behavior by the plaintiff who refuses to negotiate, or to protect
socially valuable works. Fair use has the potential to facilitate the
efficient allocation of rights similar to a liability rule without
requiring evidence of harm. A standard relying on the fair use
analysis over the balance of harms will not make the grant of a
preliminary injunction easier.
V. CONCLUSION

Preliminary injunctions in copyright present a problem with no
perfect solution. The one-size-fits-all injunction test does not
easily accommodate the differences in intellectual property. The
the social value of the use exceeds the amount by which the owner values
preventing the use, which in turn exceeds the user's expected value from the
use. This conclusion might reflect a collective judgment that social welfare is
greater if a given use proceeds, despite the fact that the individual user would
not or could not pay the owner's going rate).
224. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
225. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 72.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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injunction standard should support the societal goals for copyright.
Erring toward a property rule at the preliminary stage upholds the
important incentives for authors while also sparing the courts from
making value determinations and weighing speculative harm.
Copyright law provides a method for the courts to balance
competing claims without turning to equitable considerations.
Enforcing the right to exclude at the preliminary stage shifts the
burden from the plaintiff to the defendant to show her work is
outside of plaintiffs scope of rights, rather than making economic
arguments regarding harm. While the situation is maintained in
status quo, each party can present information on the value and
harm. Only after a full trial can each party present a full
assessment of their harms and only then can courts weigh that
harm accurately.
The courts have long recognized the practicalities of the
The
presumption standard for preliminary injunctions.2 28
presumption standard in the common law and the fair use defense
illustrate the evolution of efficiency in copyright in light of its
societal goals. Despite eBay 's claim that a "departure from the
long tradition of equity practice should not be lightly implied,"229
the tradition in the United States has been to presume irreparable
harm. In this respect, "a page of history is worth a volume of
logic."230
Aaron T. Dozeman

228. See G6mez-Arostegui, supra note 161, at 1197-98 (arguing that the
Supreme Court's reading of the historical injunction standard used by the
English Court of Chancery around 1789 is inappropriate in copyright cases. The
historical record shows that legal remedies were deemed categorically
inadequate in copyright cases).
229. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
230. Id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (quoting New York Trust Co. v.
Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.)).
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